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Abstract
Cryptocat is a Free and Open Source Software (FL/OSS)
browser extension that makes use of web technologies in
order to provide easy to use, accessible, encrypted instant
messaging to the general public.
We aim to investigate how to best leverage the accessibil-
ity and portability offered by web technologies in order
to allow encrypted instant messaging an opportunity to
better permeate on a social level. We have found that
encrypted communications, while in many cases techni-
cally well-implemented, suffer from a lack of usage due
to their being unappealing and inaccessible to the “aver-
age end-user”.
Our position is that accessibility and ease of use must be
treated as security properties. Even if a cryptographic
system is technically highly qualified, securing user pri-
vacy is not achieved without addressing the problem of
accessibility. Our goal is to investigate the feasibility
of implementing cryptographic systems in highly acces-
sible mediums, and to address the technical and social
challenges of making encrypted instant messaging acces-
sible and portable.
1 Introduction
Current popular encrypted instant messaging technolo-
gies largely implement the Off-the-Record protocol
(OTR) [1] for encryption between two parties. OTR aims
to provide forward secrecy, digital signatures, message
authentication, repudiation and plausible deniability for
conversations with two participants. OTR-encrypted chat
is generally available as a plugin for popular instant mes-
saging software [2, 3, 4, 5]. For mobile smartphones,
OTR is available built-into specialized encrypted mes-
saging applications [6, 7].
We have found that the mobile applications featuring
OTR tend to be more accessible due to their platform,
specialized purpose and design philosophy which inte-
grates OTR from the outset. However, in the case of
desktop applications, we have found that the necessity
for both parties to download, install and configure the
same chat software and OTR plugin was enough to disen-
franchise a majority of end-users from regularly engag-
ing in encrypted messaging, even if they had an urgent or
pressing need for encrypted communications.
In working with young and middle-aged professionals in
the Middle East region, we have discovered that desktop
OTR clients suffer from serious usability issues which
are sometimes further exacerbated due to language dif-
ferences and lack of cultural integration (the technology
was frequently described as “foreign”). In one case, an
activist who was fully trained to use Pidgin-OTR [2] ne-
glected to do so citing usability difficulties, and as a di-
rect consequence encountered a life-threatening situation
at the hands of a national military in the Middle East and
North Africa region (see §7.1).
These circumstances have led us to the conclusion that
ease of use and accessibility must be treated as security
properties, since their absence results in security com-
promises with consequences similar to the ones experi-
enced due to cryptographic breaks.
Cryptocat is designed to leverage highly accessible medi-
ums (the web browser) in order to offer an easy to use en-
crypted instant messaging interface accessible indiscrim-
inately to all cultures, languages and age groups. Crypto-
cat clients are available as Free Software browser exten-
sions [8] written in JavaScript and HTML5. Cryptocat
servers use the XMPP protocol [9] with XEP-0045 [10].
2 Goals
Cryptocat’s goal is to profoundly broaden the accessi-
bility of encrypted chat across platforms, cultures, lan-
guages and borders. To achieve this, we aim to expand
the limits of cryptosystem implementation in highly ac-
cessible environments.
Our main target is the web browser: a best-of-breed en-
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vironment in terms of accessibility but with a deeply
lacking research base regarding its handling of client-
side cryptographic systems. We aim to improve the re-
search base and legitimacy of secure cryptography in
the browser in order to allow for the implementation of
highly accessible and portable cryptosystems. Techni-
cal experimentation is required, as well as directly ad-
dressing issues such as code delivery and secure pseudo-
random number generation (see §6).
On a social level, Cryptocat aims to normalize the ex-
pectation that instant messaging conversations must be
encrypted against any and all undesired third parties. If
we can achieve a high level of accessibility for encrypted
instant messaging platforms, we hope that our method-
ologies will be widely adopted through our Free and
Open Source development model, thereby normalizing
the idea of private online conversation and embedding a
social expectation for communication privacy. Cryptocat
also aims to promote cats around the world as wonderful
creatures.
3 Threat model
Cryptocat’s security objectives are:
• Provide encrypted messaging where messages are
only readable by the sender and the intended recip-
ient(s).
• Provide means for parties to securely authenticate
each other’s identities.
• Protect against message forgery during conversa-
tions.
It is worth noting that our security objectives do not in-
clude protecting from compromise via hardware or mal-
ware, or the cryptographic property of plausible denia-
bility in a group conversation context, or anonymizing
the identity of user connections. That being said, plausi-
ble deniability is still provided in private messages since
these are carried over the OTR protocol. Futhermore,
Cryptocat clients are tested to be compatible with third-
party anonymizing technologies such as Tor [11], and it
is possible for Cryptocat servers to be set up as Tor Hid-
den Services [12].
Cryptocat’s threat model document [13] delineates six at-
tack points with potential threats, pinpointed along the
route from the Cryptocat user to the server. Threats are
evaluated according to the DREAD model [14] (Dam-
age, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users and
Discoverability). The attack points (A, B, C, D, E and F)
are visible in Fig. 1.
The full threat model document [13] discusses a vari-
ety of threats situated along these attack points, which
range from a phishing browser extension masquerading
Figure 1: Connections overview and attack points
as a Cryptocat application to SSL man-in-the-middle at-
tacks [15]. Our threat evaluation process is continuous
and open to public discussion.
4 Methodology
The reasoning behind our development methodology is
that Cryptocat is most likely to receive volunteer pro-
grammers, testers and security auditors via this transpar-
ent format. We believe in principles of full disclosure and
aim to achieve our security and usability through the de-
tailed and open study of our protocols, implementations
and releases, and by maximizing the involvement of both
security and usability communities.
4.1 Software development
Cryptocat software is written, published and reviewed
under a principle of radical transparency. All source
code modifications are pushed live into a public code
repository using the git revision control and source code
management system, which also hosts an issue tracker
and development wiki. All design considerations, from
cryptographic implementations to user interface con-
cerns, are discussed, decided upon and implemented in
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public. Some larger projects may be developed offline
prior to the first commit, but no release is ever made with-
out it being available as Free, Open Source Software and
properly documented on our code repository [16].
Cryptocat browser extensions, currently available for
Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Apple Safari, rely
on an identical codebase with only minor differences to
account for browser integration. Browser extensions are
signed and delivered over HTTPS.
Furthermore, routine compatibility and functionality
testing is carried out between different browsers and plat-
forms, in-house, via unit testing, and in collaboration
with beta testers around the world.
4.2 Auditing
Cryptocat browser extensions undergo regular profes-
sional security audits carried out by various independent
third party code auditing groups (see §10). Unless we are
forbidden by the auditor, all audit reports are made fully
public as soon as any critical flaws they may identify are
addressed. After our first audit [17] in November 2012,
we addressed thirteen vulnerabilities, of which two were
considered critical, and verified the fixes with the audit-
ing group within one week. The audit report was made
available to the public immediately after. Our most re-
cent audit [18] was carried out by Veracode in January
2013 and discovered no vulnerabilities within its scope,
awarding Cryptocat a score of 100/100. As of writing, a
third code audit is underway.
4.3 Localization
In order to fulfill Cryptocat’s accessibility goals, Crypto-
cat’s interface is fully translated into more than 32 lan-
guages and functions well with right-to-left scripts as
well as exotic character sets necessary for supporting lan-
guages such as Tibetan.
We use the online Transifex [19] platform in order to co-
ordinate with volunteer translators and to review and ver-
ify translations. We are entirely dependent on a world-
wide community of volunteer translators in order to help
Cryptocat break down linguistic and cultural barriers.
Currently maintained languages and dialects are Arabic,
Basque, Bengali, Bulgarian, Burmese, Catalan, Chinese,
Simplified Chinese, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, En-
glish, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, He-
brew, Italian, Japanese, Khmer, Korean, Latvian, Lol-
cat, Norwegian, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian,
Serbian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish, Tibetan, Turkish,
Uighur, Urdu and Vietnamese.
5 Architecture
Cryptocat’s technical architecture is similar to typical
XMPP chat clients with Multi-User Chat support, with
some additional features and changes required to acco-
modate for our reliance on the web browser as a plat-
form. Essentially, Cryptocat’s architecture is split into
an XMPP client capable of encrypted communications
and an XMPP server accessible via HTTPS.
5.1 Client-side
Cryptocat is delivered as a signed browser extension,
downloaded over HTTPS. The extension contains an
XMPP client that only accepts and sends encrypted mes-
sages while discarding all other communications. All
cryptographic operations take place on the client-side,
with the server only dealing with the exchange of ci-
phertext messages and user login. Cryptocat is designed
around a “chat room” model where users adopt discard-
able nicknames to join ephemeral chatrooms, encrypting
messages using ephemeral public keys.
Cryptocat uses different encryption protocols depending
on which type of communication users are engaged in.
For one-on-one chats, a JavaScript implementation [20]
of Off-the-Record messaging [1] is used. In multiparty
situations, Cryptocat currently uses its own temporary
multiparty protocol [21], with the intention of replacing
the protocol once the Multi-Party Off-the-Record mes-
saging protocol (mpOTR) [22] is specificied and imple-
mented (see §9.1).
5.2 Server-side
Connections between Cryptocat clients and servers are
illustrated in Fig. 1. On the server side, Cryptocat uses
ejabberd [23] in order to instantiate an XMPP server.
Since the Cryptocat client is built using web technolo-
gies, a Bidirectional-stream Over Synchronous HTTP
(BOSH) [24] server is used in order to instantiate an
HTTP-based transport for “push” and “pull” XMPP op-
erations. This HTTP transport is not exposed to the pub-
lic Internet and is only mapped to the local IP address;
instead, we use a separate HTTPS proxy to expose the
BOSH server globally. This is done both in order to ben-
efit from an additional layer of encryption via SSL and to
be able to offer XMPP over BOSH over a standard 443
port, therefore helping mitigate potential incompatibili-
ties with user firewalls.
Cryptocat servers use XEP-0045 [10] to instantiate group
“chat rooms”, while XEP-0077 [25] is used to allow
for spontaneous In-Band Registration of ephemeral user
identities.
Server configuration files and deployment instructions
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are available online on the Cryptocat Development Wiki
[26]. Users are encouraged to set up their own private
servers, and the Cryptocat client offers an interface for
configuring third party server connections.
6 Technical challenges
Adopting the web browser as our platform has the most
payoff in terms of securing accessibility and ease of use,
but is also recognized as a substantially risky technical
challenge. As of the introduction of the HTML5 frame-
work [27], it has been possible on a technical level to
implement the myriad features required for a proper en-
crypted instant messaging client natively in the browser.
However, we were faced with a deep lack of research,
testing, specification and implementation when it came
to certain security considerations.
Therefore, in many situations, we have had to come up
with potential solutions to these security questions our-
selves. Aside from the cases outlined in the following
subsections, Cryptocat is also participating as a test case
for the W3C Web Cryptography Working Group [28],
which is currently attempting to implement native cryp-
tographic primitives to be accessed in the browser via an
API that is exposed through JavaScript calls [29]. We ul-
timately believe that even though further research is still
required, it is absolutely necessary for web technologies
to achieve a security standard sufficient for the imple-
mentation of sophisticated cryptographic systems, if we
are to succeed in making these systems accessible to the
general public.
6.1 Code delivery
Early attempts to deliver Cryptocat as a website over
HTTPS without the requirement of installing a browser
extension were deemed an exigent security risk. This
is due to the fact that as a website, cryptographic prim-
itives were re-downloaded every time a user would ac-
cess the Cryptocat client. This left an open window for
a malicious host to serve deceptive or defective encryp-
tion software, masquerading as a legitimate Cryptocat
client. Instead, Cryptocat was rebuilt to be served as a
code-signed browser extension which connects to stan-
dard XMPP servers. This made code delivery more se-
cure and also allowed us to rely on existing standards for
server deployment.
6.2 OTR in the browser
JavaScript does not natively support arbitrary precision
arithmetic. A BigInt library, along with several custom
written operations, made up for this deficit using a com-
bination of JavaScript Array and Number types. Until
Figure 2: OTR key generation speed optimization
recently, JavaScript did not have an answer for binary
data manipulation in all browsers. Typed Array support
started to land in major web browsers in late 2012, well
after the initial development of the library had begun.
Consequently, in our OTR library, raw data is treated as
JavaScript Strings, which is slow but compatible.
OTR uses 1024-bit DSA keys which, due to the fact that
Cryptocat does not currently store long-term key pairs
(see §9.2), need to be generated, along with DSA pa-
rameters, each time the application is launched. Effi-
ciently generating these keys is paramount to user ex-
perience. Since JavaScript’s execution model is a single-
threaded, run to completion event loop, computationally
heavy operations will by default lock up the browser tab,
preventing other operations from executing. To mitigate
this issue, keys are generated in Web Workers [30] and
message-passed back to the main thread upon comple-
tion. This allows Cryptocat a first line of defense: dis-
playing randomly selected “cat facts” to keep the user
engaged as it generates keys. As of writing, Cryptocat
features over fifty highly interesting cat facts [31].
A large gain in performance came from an optimization
to the Miller-Rabin primality test by first checking if the
candidate prime is divisible by any prime number under
1,000. We further optimized the speed of OTR key gen-
eration in the browser by 33.7% by following Google’s
Go-lang implementation [33] of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA), which deviates from the FIPS 186-3
[34] standard by eliminating the verification seed used to
generate primes, since it ends up being discarded with-
out use. This significantly sped up key generation, as
seen in Fig. 2. It also led to less variance in generation
time. Furthermore, improvements to JavaScript virtual
machines have lead to optimizing compilers that execute
cryptographic operations with near-native performance
[32]. These improvements make DSA key generation
feasible in the browser.
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6.3 CSPRNG in the browser
In JavaScript, the default pseudorandom number gener-
ator is not considered cryptographically secure (except
in Opera, which implements a cryptographically secure
version of Math.random()).
As of writing, Google Chrome and Apple Safari are the
only web browsers to expose a Cryptographically Se-
cure Pseudorandom Number Generator (CSPRNG) via
JavaScript, using the window.crypto.getRandomValues()
[29] function. In Mozilla Firefox, the Crypto-
cat browser extension manually exposes this method
using a JavaScript module which implements win-
dow.crypto.getRandomValues() on a native browser level
via calls to NSSLib. We have received reassurances
from Mozilla that Firefox 22 will natively include win-
dow.crypto.getRandomValues().
In order to minimize draining of the system entropy pool,
window.crypto.getRandomValues() is only called for an
initial batch of pseudorandom values, which are then
used to seed a Salsa20 [35] implementation.
7 Social challenges
Challenges in socially normalizing cryptography are
largely due to cryptographic applications being almost
always available as sideline alternatives. Designers of
mainstream instant messaging applications are rarely
given the incentive to implement client-side cryptogra-
phy, while the designers of encrypted communication
systems usually cater to specific audiences, such as com-
puter hobbyists and enthusiasts, military and intelligence
personnel, and so on. Cryptocat has enjoyed a highly
varied user-base, ranging from LGBTQ help groups to
pre-school teachers using it to teach children about on-
line privacy.
In order for encrypted instant messaging to become a
new mainstream standard, we are required first to de-
velop the Cryptocat browser extension as an accessible,
easy and fun to use software package, while also ensur-
ing that the underlying research is available to be inde-
pendently implemented into the clients of other, more
mainstream instant messaging solutions.
Cryptocat aims to leverage the web browser environment
in order to make itself readily accessible to users who are
already familiar with mainstream instant messaging so-
lutons that use the same environment, such as Facebook
Chat. For this purpose, Cryptocat uses a neutral inter-
face with comforting color palettes and graphics, cou-
pled with usability features such as audio and desktop
notifications. We classify these interface features also as
security features, since they encourage users to engage in
a more secure form of communication, especially when
it is needed. We also solicit the aid of volunteer transla-
tors in order to maintain Cryptocat translations that help
us lessen the effect of linguistic and cultural barriers.
7.1 Unintended demographics
We have found that in attempting to standardize en-
crypted instant messaging as accessible to everyone,
there is a serious danger of being misinterpreted as
catering specifically to political activists in oppressive
regimes and others in similarly life-threatening situa-
tions. While it is understandable as to why these groups
would gravitate around a relatively highly accessible en-
crypted instant messaging solution, we have found that
clearly delineating Cryptocat’s efforts as a much broader
experimental nature to be a demanding and serious task.
As of writing, warnings and tips regarding best-use prac-
tices, translated into thirty-five languages, are included
on the Cryptocat client’s main screen.
Regarding the issue of addressing the privacy needs of
those in dangerous situations, we deem it necessary to
never rely exclusively on software, but to focus on pro-
viding capable training sessions regarding the risks in-
volved.
7.2 Buddy lists
Discussions were held early in Cryptocat’s development
to decide on whether features such as user accounts and
buddy lists were to be implemented. While such features
would greatly enhance user experience and ease of use
by allowing users to quickly communicate with friends
and check on the status of their contacts, we have decided
against implementing these features in order to minimize
the amount of user metadata held on Cryptocat XMPP
servers. Were these features implemented, the Cryptocat
XMPP server would have likely recorded, in plain text,
the contact lists and user account information of all of its
users. In order to maximize user privacy and minimize
server data retention, we have therefore opted for a “chat
room” model, even though that model is arguably less
user-friendly. This example illustrates the balancing act
between usability and security that has provided the most
central and essential questions surrounding Cryptocat’s
development decisions.
7.3 Encouraging authentication
We have found that average users generally do not bother
authenticating each other’s identities using public key
fingerprints, due to the task’s cumbersome nature. In
order to facilitate this, we have introduced public-key
derived color codes that provide a limited, albeit more
likely to be used, capacity to verify identities. We are
also implementing the Socialist Millionaires’ Problem
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protocol in order to allow for in-band question/answer
authentication (see §9.4).
8 Availability and status
Cryptocat is currently available as a browser extension
for Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Apple Safari
through the Cryptocat website [8]. It is currently in Beta,
experimental status.
9 Limitations and future work
Although browser tab thread-level sandboxing is quickly
improving and increasingly more difficult to break, es-
pecially in the case of Google Chrome [36], we be-
lieve that the browser’s architecture, which is designed
to handle and execute myriad amounts of different data
types, needs additional research in the area of sandbox-
ing. Improvements in this area will greatly aid the web
browser with securely handling cryptographic data. We
also believe that research is required towards implement-
ing other security features in JavaScript, such as secure
memory erasure for cryptographic keys.
9.1 Implementing mpOTR
The lack of a Multi-Party Off the Record protocol spec-
ification and implementation remains a serious imped-
iment towards achieving more secure encrypted group
instant messaging. While research material currently
exists regarding mpOTR [22], specification and imple-
mentation still require serious effort due to the nature of
the problem of efficiently implementing deniable multi-
party encrypted chat. The current pragmatic value of
plausible deniability in the OTR context is uncertain.
9.2 Permanent key storage
A suitable storage mechanism for long-term keys has
yet to be decided upon, nor has importing long-term
keys been implemented in Cryptocat. This means that
DSA keys are regenerated every time the application
is launched, requiring chat participants to verify finger-
prints in an out-of-band channel at each conversation, or
use the Socialist Millionaires’ Problem protocol to ver-
ify a shared secret. Key storage and SMP are currently
available in our OTR library but are still undergoing test-
ing and review [37].
9.3 File transfer
Cryptocat implements an OTR-XMPP file transfer spec-
ification [38] that leverages the extra symmetric keys
made available in the third version of the OTR messag-
ing protocol.
There were three aspects to achieving secure file trans-
fers: establishing a shared secret key between clients,
choosing the cryptographic primitives used for file en-
cryption, and selecting a transfer protocol. In the
third version of the OTR messaging protocol, an extra
symmetric key is derived during authenticated key ex-
changes, with the intention of being used for secure com-
munication over a different channel. Therefore, an API
is provided in the JavaScript OTR library, and used in
Cryptocat, to derive a shared 256 bit key. We then run
this shared key through SHA512 to expand it to 512 bits.
The first 256 bits of the resulting expanded key are used
with AES-256, in counter mode, to encrypt chunks of the
file. The second 256 bits are used in HMAC-SHA512 for
authentication. To transfer the file, we implemented the
XEP-0047 specification [39], which defines an XMPP
protocol to enable entities to establish a bytestream. Data
is broken down into smaller chunks (64Kb) and trans-
ported in-band over XMPP.
9.4 SMP
The OTR specification provides two methods of detect-
ing impersonation or man-in-the-middle attacks: com-
paring fingerprints and the Social Millionaires’ Proto-
col (SMP). Due to the current limitation involving long-
term key storage, verification of fingerprints in a differ-
ent channel at each conversation is required. SMP offers
a more convenient alternative and, as we have argued,
ease of use will encourage clients to make use of this
security feature. SMP allows two users to compare a se-
cret without revealing any information about that secret,
other than whether or not it is known.
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